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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
Laos by South Vietnamese ground forces
supported by American firepower, airpower and logistical support and the likelihood of more intense participation by
North Vietnamese forces in this area.
close to its border.
This recent thrust of all-out conflict
into still another region of Southeast
As1a represents a gamble which may not
be worth tlie risks involved. Rather than
a sh01 tening of the war and a further
1 eduction of casualties, the consequences
of tliis air-ground invasion may be to
lengthen the war and increase the casualties. The outcome of this new military
venture depends not only on the success
of the South Vietnamese forces in Laos
but on the reaction there and elsewhere
of the North Vietnamese and perhaps
other Asian nations.
The gamble in Laos is likely, in my
opinion, to make it still more difficult to
arrive at a negotiated settlement. Furthermore, it may well increase, again,
the number of U.S . .casualties and raise
the number 'of American prisoners of war
who have been taken in Southeast Asia.
With regard to the American prisoners. the North Vietnamese have stated
that the issue would not even be discussed until it is evident that U.S. forces are
to be withdrawn completely from Vietnam. In my opinion, these men are held
as hostages to that end and this action is
almost certain to delay their release.
Threats are not likely to deter North
Vietnam from that course.
Nor is it at all certain, as has been
suggested, thatrThey-'the North Vletnamea~have to
fight ther~ln Laos-or give up the struggle.

LAOS: SOME QUESTIONS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at

the moment, the situation in Southeast
Asia shows clearly that for many months
U.S. casualties have been held lower, that
fewer Americans have been engaged in
combat, and that the cost of the war has
decreased. These are consequences of the
withdrawal of more than 200,000 Americans, a decision which was made at the
outset of this administration. The consequences are, of course, welcome.
On the other side of the coin, it is also
obvious that the arena of the war in
Vietnam has been enlarged into an Indochinese war and the executive branch
has made us partners in that expansion.
First came the invasion of Cambodia last
spring with U.S. ground forces and the
subsequent widespread devastation of
what had been the stable economic and
social life of that country. We are there
now with hundreds of millions of dollars
in aid and a n.ounting stat! of American
officials. Now there is the invasion of

The option is theirs as it has been from
the outset. The fact is that they still have
many cards in Cambodia, elsewhere in
Laos, in South Vietnam, and in North
Vietnam.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
time of the Senator from Montana has
expired.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if the Chair will recognize me, I
shall be glad to yield to the able majority leader my 3 minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from West Virginia.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
Senator from Montana may proceed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what
if they opt not to fight at this time in
Laos? What 1f they do stand and win
against South Vietnamese forces in that
remote area? What course is open to this
Nation then?
What if they draw back now but return in May and resume use of the present Ho Chi Minh Trails or new trails on
an accelerated basis?
What if the present penetration
prompts them to move further west on
the approaches to Thailand, even as the
incursion into the Cambodian border
areas last spring prompted them to move
westward throughout Cambodia?
In short, we must ask . ourselves
whether a temporary invasion of Laos,
and I emphasize the word temporary,
will have any real et!ect on the capab111ties of North Vietnam to wage a continuing war in Southeast Asia? According to North Vietnamese calculations,
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they have already been at war at least
25 years and an additional 25 years of
conflict may well be anticipated.
These are questions which put in balance the military gamble which is now
taking place in Laos. Is it worth the
lives-American and others-which it already claims? Will it fulfill the objective
of shortening the war, so that the U.S.
military phaseout can be continued and
accelerated? Will it hasten negotiations
which will end this tragedy and thus permit a complete U.S. withdrawal?
Will it help the plight of our prisoners
of war?
Indeed, has any previous escalation of
the conflict since the Tonkin Gulf----the
use of B-52 bombers, the massive air and
naval war against North Vietnam, the
secret air war in Laos, the incw·sion into
Cambodia--have any one of these previous escalations fulfilled its promise to
these ends?
In my opinion we may well be up
against a stacked deck in Laos.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, we all
honor the distinguished majority leader's views here. I am bound ·to say that
I cannot accept them as stated, for a
number of reasons.
First, I think it ought to be pointed
out that the incursion into Cambodia of
last .May was limited, that it worked, that
it had the effect of cutting olf 85 percent
of the supplies being received by the
enemy which were coming through Sihanoukville, that we know of, to all of
the personnel, and 15 percent of the supplies were coming down the Ho Chi Minh
Trail.
This incursion into Laos may or may
not succeed. It is the judgment of our
military authorities that it will succeed.
I! it does, it will severely cripple the
enemy's ability to resist and will improve
our chances in the talks at Paris and will
greatly strengthen the ongoing Vietnamization of the South Vietnamese.
If this happens, then the enemy will be
unable to mass forces for retaliation
during the dry season. He certainly will
not be able to do so during the monsoon
or the wet season. This carries him on
inbo November or December.
The purpose of these operations 1s to
enable us to get our troops out of there,
which we are doing. Our withdrawal
from Indochina is continuing during the
incursion of the South Vietnamese into
Laos.

Indeed, I think this is why we can
point· to the cooling of America and to
the challenges which other priorities are
demanding, the greening of America and
the growing of America.
I cannot join in the deploring of the
successful operations, operations which
so far at least, appear to be successful,
whim everything the President has done
has been proven to be justified in ending
the war.
The President has taken large numbers o'f troops out. And he wjll take more
out. On May 1, or around that time, there
will be other announcements.
It seems tame that this 1s not a heightening of the war but a constriction of the
war. The war has always been in Laos. It
has alw~eys been in Cambodia. The dit!erence is that only one side was able to
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use these privileged .sanctuaries, and now
the other side, without the use of U.S.
ground forces, have put an end to something that ought to have been put an
end to 4 years or more ago, I respectfully submit.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an
article entitled, "The Curious Liberal
View ·of Southeast Asia," written by
Crosby S . Noyes of· February 7, 1971. This
article does not relate to what the distinguished majority leader has had to
say.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CuRious LmERAL VIEw OF SouTHEAsT ASIA
(By Crosby S. Noyes)
The anger of the liberals over recent developments In Southeast Asia. defies rational
analysis.
What Is It that they want? What do they
really feel? What would they do If they were
making the decisions about our policy In
Asia.?
The answers, I submit, are not nearly as
simple as they seem. The fatal weakness of
the liberal position at this point Is that It
Is Inherently a. minority position, not because
the government or the majority of the country Is reactionary and warlike, but because
what the liberals recommend could not be
adopted by any American government.
The one consistent characteristic of liberal
thinking today Is that of dissent-not from
any particuLar policy, but from any policy
that has the slightest chance of success.
When It comes to Southeast Asia., the !aUure
of American policy bas become a primary
article of ta.Ith to practicing liberals.
The anger at the present course of events
Is real enough. There Is l!ttle that happens
In this country or abroad that does not fuel
their sense of exasperation a.nd dismay. Their
capacity for dire prediction 1s llmltless.
The liberals are even angry at each other.
The peace movement, they complain, Is dead,
kU!ed otr by the machinations of a. devious
&dmln!Btmtlon. Even the peace bloc In the
Senate seems to be showing new signs o! Indecision and Impotence.
And meanwbUe, of course, everything 1s
going to hell In a bandbasket.
The Cambodians, despite all the predictions, are showing signs of determination In
resisting the lnvaalon of their country by
North VIetnam. The South VIetnamese are
said to be Invading Laos with the objectjust Imagine It--o! breaking up Communist
supply lines Into tbetr country. And worst
of &II, the Americana are helping them, even
wb1le cl&lmlng that they Intend to withdraw
the bulk of their forces In VIetnam as quickly
as possible.
Small wonder the liberals feel betrayed.
This Is hardly the scenario they had in mind
when the Senate doves pushed through the
Cooper-Church a.mendJ:ll,ent last summer.
And if, in the end, they were unable to limit
the use of American a.lr power In supporting
a.cttons in Laos and Cambodia, why surely
the administration should have understood
what they meant to do.
But what !s It exactly that they did intend? The liberal lexicon Is a bit murky
when It comes to practical policy, but a
few solid points show through the rhetoric.
They would, presumably, prohibit all help
for Camboc11a and Laos and !or the South
VIetnamese operating in these countries.
They also would ll<lt a firm date !or the end
of the American Involvement In VIetnamIncluding the withdrawal or all American
troops and support for the Vietnamese army.
And nne.Uy, they would pull the rug out from
under the "unrepresentative and repressive"
THE

government in Saigon and set up In Its place
a coalition '!1.1lllng to come to terms with
Hanoi.
Or would they?
The curious thing about the Senate liberals ls that while they readily make ruinous
suggestions about what others might do,
they show little zest !or putting such suggestions Into effect. The chances, for ln~tance,
of extending the Cooper-Church amendment
to cover the use of American air power ln
CambOdia and Laos are rated at practically
zero.
If you B.lik them, furthermore. whether

they really would prefer to see a Communist
government in control In Cambodia or Laos,
they will say of course not If you a>'k them
who would be served by a public timetable
for an American departure from \ l~tnam ,
they change the subject. If you ask them
whether they consider the goYernment In
Hanoi more representat i\·e and less repreBslve than the one In Saigon, they Bay it Is
beside the point.
More than anything el<e , one feels. there
Is an apprehension that It may all work
out-that the disaster they have been predicting so relentlessly over the years may
not actually come about. It Is, quite obviously, a luxury which only the oppo,ltlon
can at'ford. And the liberals at thl5 point
seem devoutly attached to theJr oppc-sitlon
role.

Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, I rise tD
support what the distinguished Senator
from Pennsylvania has had to say.
I am distressed by the continuing criticism of our actions in Southeast Asia,
specifically our bombing of Laos and
Cambodia. This running commentary in
many Instances is little more than "crying wolf."
I regret these attack~ against the President, because they only hinder our efforts to withdraw Ame1ican fighting men
from this conflict and make it increasingly difficult to achieve a negotiated
peace.
Is it not tl.me to put aside partisan
caterwauling and unite in commorn purPOse to end this tragic war? Is it not tl.me
to stop trying to use American POW's as
poll tical pawns?
No one wants to prolong any war. Instead of being "barbaric," our bombing
missions in Laos and Cambodia were
called to hit the enemies last remaining
supply route-to destroy their ammunition, supplies, and food-and , therefore,
theu· ability to wage war.
The President has kept his word to
the American people. Critics should note
that we now have some 330,000 men in
Vietnam, 200,000 less than were there 2
years ago. We continue to negotiate sincerely-without any response from the
North Vietnamese other than the usual
diatribe.
We continue to seek humane treatment and early release of American prisoners of war-without any response
from North Vietnam; other than a continuation of the abuse of our men.
Is it America that is now at fault? I
think not. Nor do I believe charges of
political malfeasance assist the cause of
peace or the hope for early return of our
men.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, when
the distinguished Senator from Tennessee has had an opportunity to read in full
the remarks which I made, he will understand that I was not attacking the President of the United States. I have never
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attacked any President of the United
States. I realize the tremendous responsibilities which any President has. However, by the same token, I am aware of
the responsibilities which we as individual Senators have.
In response to the remarks of my distinguished counterpart, the minority
leader. may I say that I, too, am pleased
that as far as the reactions of the United
States are concerned, this represents a
cooling-off period, to use his words. But
the fact that there is such a period does
not mean that these questions which I
have raised in relation to Vietnam and
Indochina, and which may well spread
elsewhere. are not worthy of consideration by the Senate and the American
people.
I believe that in the course of my remarks I gave the President full credit for
the withdrawal of troops and the slowing
down of the war up to this time. But it is
pretty fair to say that under the present
circumstances the war might well be increased and expanded, the casualties
could be increased, the possibilities of the
release of the POW's could be decreased,
and our chances for success, which are
not very good at the present, would not
be bettered in the negotiations at Paris.
One thing I have not forgotten-and
do not intend to forget-is the casualty
lists that come in. I have not gotten an
answer as to the latest casualties, for the
last 3 weeks, from the Department of
Defense.
As of January 9, 1971, however, 53.359
Americans have died; 44,268 in combat,
and 9,091 in noncombat capacities. The
number of men wounded is 293,612 and
the total figure of casualties is 346,971.
I daresay that figure has increased by
sevral thousand in the past month,
cotmtlng both dead and wounded.
So I rise on the floor of the Senate. as
I always try to do with a proper understanding of the situation which confronts this Nation, of a deep appreciation
of the responsibilities which are the President's, but not forgetting for a moment
that we, as Senators, have a responsibility, and it is our duty and our obligation, to express our thoughts when. we
can in good conscience.
Mr. CHURCH addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
Senator from Idaho is recognized.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I wish to
commend the distinguished majority
leader for his excellent statement on the
most recent developmentS in the war in
Southeast Asia.
Any intimation to the effect that the
majority leader expresses a partisan view
with regard to the war is so completely
and utterly refuted by the record that I
hardly need stress it here. Nevertheless,
the Senate will remember well that the
majority leader began to express his misgivings concerning this war long ago
during the tenure of the Democratic
P resident. He has been consistent
throughout the years in admonishing
against expansion of that war and American participation in it. If his advice had
been taken years ago, 53,000 Americans
would not have died in Vietnam and a
quarter of a m1llion men would not have
been maimed and wounded.
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I, for one, am glad the distinguished
maJont.y leader continues to ~pe!\k out
Hist.or~ bears out the accuracy of Ins
forecasts in the past and the soundness of
his misgivings.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President. I wish to say most respectfully to
the able Senator from Tennessee that I
have read the statement by our distinguished majority leader and I listened
with great care as he made that :-tat.ement..
I recognize the fact. that. the Senator
from Tennessee did not criticize the majority leader by name in his remarks, but
coming on the heels of the remarks by
the maJority leader it can be appropriately il ferred by readers of the RECORD
and those who ho,ard the remarks that
some criticism might have been meant
and directed to the majmity leader for
the statement he had just made.
In the majority leader's prepared
statement there was no "cnliclsm' of
the President. There was no attack on
the President. I am using now the words
of the able Senator from Tennessee, as
I recall them. He used the words "attacks
ag·ainst the President." There was no
attack against the President by the majority leader in his statement. There was
no "partisanship."
I have been in the Senate for 12 years,
and I have seen Jess "partisanship" displayed by the majority leader than I
have seen displayed by any other leader
in my 12 years in the Senate, my 6 years
in the House of Representatives, and my
6 years in both houses of the West Virginia Legislature. There is su pposed to be
a little partisanship in a party leader,
but there was none in this speech by the
distinguished majority leader.
The majority leader did not say anything that would indicate an attempt t.o
"use American prisoners of war as political pawns." I think the record should be
made clear that the majority leader
raised legitimate questions-questions
that should be raised. I salute him for
raising those questons. I would ha\'e a
few of my own. For example, I would
like to see a more definitive announcement on how much this operation is
costing t.he United States in men and,..
rmateriel, the exact number of helicopters that have been downed, and the
number of helicopters that could not be
retrieved. I would like to know how many
Americans have died as a result ot this
offensive. I do not necessarily criticize
the efforts being made in Laos by raising these questions, but they are legitimate questions. Of course, North Vietnamese troops are being forced to fight.
If they chose not to do so, the Ho Chi
Minh Trail would be effectively cut and
the threat to American forces in South
Vietnam would be weakened. There are
two sides to the issue, but the questions
raised here today are reasonable and
pertinent.
I hope we would be very careful not to
mt6interpret as partisan that which was
not partisan or as an attack upon the
President that which was not. The statement by the majority leader was clear
and ought not be misunderstood.
Mr. BROCK. Mr. nresident, may I say
to the distinguished Senator from West
Virginia and particularly to the distin-

guished majo1 ;ty leader thnt I appreciate their comments. I, too, regret that my
remark~ ~ell immedmtel~ fol' :)V.'ng V1e
remarks b\' the Senator from Montana.
I would ·point out for thC" record that
my remarks were prcrared prior .o th
session of Lh!! Senute this morni11g, and
i 1 reSl»Ol se to .comments I rend i'l the
newspaper la~t e\·enmg and tliis morning.
Tlw.:;e slt tements statcd that the Ples,dent has given up on a political Sfllution, and that he has gneu up on negotmtions in Paris, and t.hat he has given up
011 the release of ou!· prisoners and is
ft rting with world war III. Those are
::;t atemeuts with which I categorically
disagree. Again I was re~ponding to the
p1·ess account I read ·n the morning
newspaper~.

I want to make the situ.1tion absolutely
clear that I did not refer to the di.,tinguished majority leader in my charges of
partiansh.ip or charges of playing with
our American prisoners of war I would
not do so.
Mr. MA...'Il'SFIELD. Mr. President, I exPI ess my thanks to the distinguished
Senator uom Tennessee for his most
gracioUs remarks. I feel now that he had
somethmg else in mind at the time. It
was an w1fortw1at.e comcidence that all
of these remarks happen to come at the
same time, and I think now the record
will not be misinterpreted.
I thank the Senator.

I
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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. 1 MONTANA)

At the moment, the situation in Southeast Asia shows clearly
that for many months U.

s.

casualties have been held lower, that fewer

Americans have been engaged in combat, and that the cost of the war has
decreased.

These are consequences of the withdrawal of more than 200,000

Americans, a decision which was made at the outset of this Administration.
The consequences are, of course, welcome.
On the other side of the coin, it is also obvious that the arena
of the war in Viet Nam has been enlarged into an Indochinese war and the
Executive Branch has made us partners in that expansion.

First came the

invasion of Cambodia last spring with Uo S. ground forces and the subsequent widespread devastation of what had been the stable economic and eoeial
life of that country.

We are there now with hundreds of millions of dollars

in aid and a mounting staff of American officials.

Now there is the invasion

of Laos by South Vietnamese ground forces supported by American fire power,
air power and logistical support and the likelihood of more intense participation by North Vietnamese forces in this area close to its border.
This recent thrust of all-out conflict into sti. 11 another region
of Southeast Asia represents a gamble which may not be worth the risks
involved.

Rather than a shortening of the war and a further reduction of

casualties, the consequences of this air-ground invasion may be to lengthen
the war and increase the casualties.

The outcome of this new military venture

depends not only on the success of the South Vietnamese forces in Laos but on
the reaction there and elsewhere of the North Vietnamese and perhaps other
Asian nations to the invasion.
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The gamble in Laos is likely, in my opinion, make it still more
I'

difficult to arrive at a negotiated settlement .

FUrthermore, it may well

increase, again, the number of U. S. casualties and raise the number of
American prisoners of war who have been taken in Southeast Asia.
With regard to the American prisoners , the North Vietnamese have
stated that the issue would not even be discussed until it is evident that
U. S. forces are to be withdrawn completely from Viet Nam.

In my opinion,

these men are held as hostages to that end and this action is almost certain
i

to delay their release .

Threats are not likely to deter North Viet Nam

from that course •
Nor is it at all certain, as has been suggested, that "they (the
North Vietnamese) have to fight there (in Laos) or give up the struggle . "
The option is theirs as it has been from t he outset.

The fact is that they

still have many cards in Cambodia, elsewhere in Laos 1 in South Viet Nam and
in North Viet Nam .

What if they opt not to fight at this time in Laos?

What if they do stand and win against South Vietnamese forces in that remote
area?

What course is open to this nation then?
d'r:,. w

What if they ~?back now but ret urn in May and resume use of the
present Ho Chi Minh Trails or new trails on an accelerated basis?
What if the present penetration prompts them to move further west
on the approaches to Thailand, even as t he incursion int o the Cambodian
border areas last spring prompt ed them to move westward throughout Cambodia?
In short,

we

must ask ourselves whether a temporary invasion of

Laos, and I emphasize the word temporary, will have any real effect on the

..j'() W~"·~~-

capabilities of North Viet Nam 0f~~ a continuing war in Sout heast Asia?
~

..
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- 3 According to North Vietnamese calculations, they have already been at war
at least 25 years and an additional 25 years of conflict may well be
anticipated.
These are questions which put in balance the mill tary gamble
which is now taking place in Laos.
others--which it already claims?

Is it worth the lives--American and
Will it fulfill the objective of shorten•

ing the war, so that the U. S. military phase-out can be continued and
accelerated?

Will it hasten negotiations which will end this tragedy and

thus penni t a complete U. S. withdrawal?
Will it help the plight of our prisoners of war?
Indeed, has any previous escalation of the conflict since the
Tonkin Gulf--the use of B-52 banbers, the massive air and naval war against
North Viet Nam, the secret air-war in Laos, the incursion into Cambodia-have any of these previous escalations fulfilled its promise to these ends?
In

my

opinion we may well be up against a stacked deck in Laos.

